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Insolvency practitioners from 88 countries describe how debt enforce-
ment will proceed against an identical hotel about to default on its
debt. We use the data on time, cost, and the likely disposition of the
assets (preservation as a going concern vs. piecemeal sale) toconstruct
a measure of the efﬁciency of debt enforcement in each country. This
measure is strongly correlated with per capita income and legal origin
and predicts debt market development. Several characteristics of debt
enforcement procedures, such as the structure of appeals and avail-
ability of ﬂoating charge ﬁnance, inﬂuence efﬁciency.
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I. Introduction
Debt is one of the most useful contracts in every economy since it enables
ﬁrms to ﬁnance investment and individuals to smooth consumption.
But, like any other contract, debt needs to be enforced. To enforce debt
contracts, societies create a variety of legal mechanisms or institutions
that allow lenders to go after a defaulting borrower’s income and assets
without resorting to violence. Some of the debt enforcement institu-
tions, such as some foreclosure proceedings, do not require courts.
However, in the case of ﬁrms with multiple creditors, many societies rely
on courts to enforce debt contracts, usually through bankruptcy or in-
solvency procedures.
Despite the importance of debt enforcement, insolvency institutions
are generally perceived to perform poorly, even in advanced market
economies but especially in developing countries. This raises several
questions: How poorly do these institutions function? Why do they func-
tion poorly? Are there ways to improve them? Are these reform strategies
consistent with the other institutions and capabilities of a country?
To address these questions, we study debt enforcement with respect
to an insolvent ﬁrm in 88 countries. We present insolvency practitioners
in each country with the same case study of an insolvent ﬁrm. The case
was developed jointly with the Committee on Bankruptcy of the Inter-
national Bar Association to be representative of insolvency of a midsize
ﬁrm in many countries. The ﬁrm is a hotel with a given number of
employees, capital and ownership structure, value as a going concern,
and a lower value if sold piecemeal.
1 The ﬁrm is otherwise identical
across countries except that the economic values are all normalized by
the country’s per capita income.
We then ask each practitioner to describe in detail how debt enforce-
ment for these case facts in his or her country will proceed, step by
step. The detailed narratives provided and conﬁrmed by the practition-
ers tell us which procedure is likely to be used in each country for debt
enforcement (foreclosure, liquidation, or an attempt at reorganization)
and allow us to compute the time and the cost of the chosen procedure,
to learn whether the hotel will be kept together or sold piecemeal, and
to use all these data to compute a measure of efﬁciency of the debt
enforcement procedure for each country. We also collect detailed data
on both legal and economic characteristics of the debt enforcement
procedure for our case in each country. We can thus assess which in-
stitutional features are conducive to the economically efﬁcient treatment
of assets and overall efﬁciency—at least in our relatively simple case.
1 We have also presented them with a case in which the value if sold piecemeal is higher,
but that case had some problems and is not discussed in detail in this paper. For details,
see Djankov et al. (2006).debt enforcement around the world 1107
Comparing debt enforcement against essentially the same business in
different countries has many advantages. First, it allows an analysis of
the efﬁciency of these procedures, as well as of its determinants, with
relatively less concern that we are comparing apples to oranges. Second,
we provide quantitative measures of enforcement and so are less vul-
nerable to the critique, sometimes leveled against La Porta et al. (1997,
1998), that we are just looking at law on the books. Third, commonly
deﬁned measures of law enforcement across countries can be used in
other comparative studies. Despite these advantages and despite the
advice of insolvency experts in designing our case, the case study ap-
proach has several limitations, which we discuss later in the paper.
Our analysis is organized around the procedures that the respondents
say are likely to be used in their countries to address the insolvency of
the hotel. There are only three basic procedures used around the world:
(1) foreclosure by the senior creditor, which may or may not involve a
court; (2) liquidation; and (3) reorganization, which often leads to
subsequent liquidation (we call this type of procedure “reorganization
ﬁrst”).
2 Foreclosure serves as an important benchmark since, with only
one senior creditor with socially correct incentives, it can at least con-
ceptually achieve the efﬁcient outcome. Because under our case facts
foreclosure, which can be a contractual solution with no or minimal
court involvement, can address insolvency without formal bankruptcy,
the title of the paper is “debt enforcement” rather than bankruptcy or
insolvency.
Our ﬁndings can be brieﬂy summarized. Looking at worldwide av-
erages, we ﬁnd that all procedures are extremely time-consuming, costly,
and inefﬁcient. Only 36 percent of the countries achieve the efﬁcient
outcome of keeping the hotel as a going concern. Between the trans-
action costs of debt enforcement, the delay cost of the proceedings, and
the loss from reaching the wrong outcome, a worldwide average of 48
percent of the hotel’s value is lost in debt enforcement. We ﬁnd that
legal origins and per capita income are the most important cross-country
determinants of efﬁciency. In addition, richer countries have a com-
parative advantage at more complex procedures (see also Djankov, Glae-
ser, et al. 2003; Franks and Lo ´ra ´nth 2005; Gennaioli and Rossi 2007;
Ayotte and Yun 2009).
We also ﬁnd that various speciﬁc economic and legal rules are asso-
ciated with differences in efﬁciency of debt enforcement procedures
across countries. Most important, many countries legally mandate de-
viations from absolute priority of the secured senior creditor. Such de-
2 Baird (1986), White (1989), Baird and Rasmussen (2002), and LoPucki (2003) discuss
the procedures used in the United States. Thorburn (2000) presents evidence in support
of liquidation in Sweden. Bris, Welch,andZhu(2006)present evidencethatreorganization
generates greater asset values than liquidation in the United States.1108 journal of political economy
viations are more pronounced in the poorer and the French legal origin
countries. Looking at debt recovery by the senior creditor (a measure
of ex ante efﬁciency) as opposed to ex post efﬁciency as the indicator
of debt enforcement renders our ﬁndings on per capita income and
legal origin even stronger.
We ﬁnd that foreclosure works extremely well with “ﬂoating charge”
debt securities, when the whole business is pledged as collateral, but
poorly when only speciﬁc assets can be pledged. This result is consistent
with the observation that, under our case facts, the senior creditor has
the socially optimal incentives to dispose of the business as long as he
can gain control of it in default. We also ﬁnd, in the same spirit, that
the efﬁciency of foreclosure rises when the senior creditor is allowed
to take collateral in an out-of-court procedure.
3 Turning to insolvency
proceedings, we ﬁnd that legal rules that require the company to sus-
pend operations, or that allow suppliers and customers to rescind con-
tracts while the company is in bankruptcy, reduce efﬁciency. Moreover,
extensive appeal of judicial decisions during insolvency proceedings and
the failure to continue the proceedings during appeal are both detri-
mental to efﬁciency. Finally, our measures of the efﬁciency of debt en-
forcement are economically and statistically signiﬁcant predictors of the
development of debt markets across countries.
Section II presents our case and the data collection procedure. Sec-
tion III describes how we go from the information collected from in-
solvency practitioners to data. Section IV presents the basic results on
the time, cost, resolution, and efﬁciency of the procedures and their
determinants in 88 countries. Section V focuses on legal violations of
absolute priority. Section VI looks at the speciﬁc structural features of
the debt enforcement procedures. Section VII analyzes cross-country
determinants of private debt market development. Section VIII presents
conclusions.
II. The Case Study
Our data are based on answers to a questionnaire completed by attorneys
and judges who are members of Section J of the International Bar
Association (IBA). Section J’s members are practitioners in the areas of
insolvency, restructuring, and creditors’ rights. In 2002, we approached
the section’s chair with a request to develop a research survey that
compares bankruptcy systems around the world. We asked for pro bono
cooperation in developing the questionnaire, piloting it, and adminis-
tering it worldwide using Section J members as respondents. The IBA
3 Franks and Sussman (2005) provide compelling evidence that ﬂoating charge debt
works extremely well as the basis of foreclosure of small and medium-size U.K. companies.debt enforcement around the world 1109
approved the proposal and assigned attorneys from the United King-
dom, Germany, and Spain, as well as bankruptcy judges from Japan and
the United States, to cooperate with us on the initial case study and
questionnaire. The initial case and the questionnaire were then piloted
in Argentina, Brazil, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Japan, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Following these pilots, several modiﬁcations were made to ensure com-
patibility of the case facts with different legal systems.
We then asked six bankruptcy attorneys from developing countries
(Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, India, and Kazakhstan) to com-
plete the revised survey, to comment on its relevance to their countries,
and to suggest changes. This second pilot yielded several modiﬁcations,
including most importantly the suggestion to simplify the case to a single
bank creditor, since it was unusual in the experience of these attorneys
for a hotel to deal with multiple banks. The attorneys also recommended
the inclusion of multiple suppliers as nonﬁnancial creditors, since this
was a common feature in bankruptcy cases. We were also asked to add
questions on the relationship between out-of-court foreclosure and re-
organization procedures. Finally, the attorneys insisted that we give more
prominence to the tax administration, which in several of these coun-
tries is the likely party to initiate bankruptcy proceedings. The case was
then adjusted to incorporate these recommendations.
The newly revised survey was sent to members of Section J in each
country by the chair. Once the completed surveys were returned, the
research team conducted several calls with each respondent to clarify
their answers and then conference calls with all respondents from a
given country to achieve a consensus answer (most disagreements arose
from misunderstandings of case facts). In total, 344 attorneys and 34
judges from 88 countries participated in the survey, but our method-
ology uses one consensus answer per country. Four rounds of the survey
were conducted, including January 2003 (pilot survey), 2004, 2005, and
2006. The paper uses the data benchmarked to January 2006.
The sample covers all countries with income per capita greater than
US$1,000 and population more than 1.5 million in 2005.
4 It includes
30 high-income, 20 upper-middle-income, and 38 lower-middle-income
countries. Eight countries are in the East Asia region, 22 in Eastern
Europe, 18 in Latin America, 13 in the Middle East, four in Africa, and
one in South Asia; 22 are OECD countries.
The respondents are presented with a standardized case study of an
insolvent ﬁrm called Mirage. Mirage is a limited liability, domestically
owned hotel business located in the most populous city. Mirage has 201
4 The World Bank deﬁnes a small state to be one with a population of less than 1.5
million.1110 journal of political economy
employees and 50 suppliers, each of which is owed money for its last
delivery. Five years ago, Mirage borrowed from Bizbank, a domestic
bank, and bought real estate (the hotel building), using it as security
for the Bizbank loan. The loan has a 10-year term. Mirage has observed
the payment schedule and all other conditions of the loan up to now.
Mirage is owned 51 percent by Mr. Douglas, its founder, who is also
the chairman of the supervisory board. No other shareholder has above
5 percent of the voting power. There is a professional general manager,
with no idiosyncratic human capital. The total amount of debt outstand-
ing is set at 136 units. Unsecured creditors (including suppliers, the tax
authority, and the employees) hold 36 units (26 percent) as a whole,
or 12 units for each group. The balance of total debt is held by Bizbank
(74 percent)—equivalent to 100 units. With only one large secured
creditor, Mirage’s bankruptcy presents a relatively simple case (although
in some countries, this creditor does not have absolute priority).
In the past, Mirage has always turned a proﬁt, covering all costs and
regularly paying the loan from Bizbank. The company had projected
to continue this performance into the future. However, recently Mirage
experienced an unexpected operating loss due to worsened industry
conditions. The management expects that, in the next 2 years, Mirage
can cover its operating expenses from projected revenues (and so does
not need additional cash to operate) but will not make enough money
to pay back Bizbank. As a consequence, Mirage is about to default.
Bizbank has not seen the new projections yet.
We stipulate that the value of Mirage is higher as a going concern
than if sold piecemeal. Speciﬁcally, Mirage is worth 100 units as a going
concern (equal to the value owed to Bizbank) and 70 units if sold
piecemeal (buildings, furniture, etc.). Since Mirage is experiencing a
temporary downturn, the economically efﬁcient outcome is to keep it
a going concern. Under these assumptions, Bizbank has socially correct
incentives if it gains control of Mirage because it is owed the maximum
potential value of the company. The efﬁcient strategy for our case facts
is clear: to turn Mirage over to Bizbank and to let Bizbank run it or sell
it as a going concern.
Like Bizbank, other parties prefer to keep Mirage operating as a going
concern and avoid piecemeal sale (although they would like a part of
the proceeds). Mr. Douglas wants to keep the ﬁrm in operation under
his control but does not care whether current management stays. Mi-
nority shareholders want to do likewise because with a piecemeal sale
they get nothing. The management of Mirage wants to keep the ﬁrm
in operation and keep their jobs. The suppliers prefer Mirage to con-
tinue operations, since this may make it more likely that they recover
the trade credit due, and they want to continue doing business with
Mirage. In countries in which wages do not have priority over secureddebt enforcement around the world 1111
creditors, workers want Mirage to continue in business since they may
not get paid in full if it is sold piecemeal. Even where wages have priority,
workers still prefer Mirage to continue operating, as long as they value
their jobs. The tax administration will follow the procedure that max-
imizes its expected recovery rate. Other things equal, the tax adminis-
tration wants Mirage to continue in business since future tax revenues
are lost in a piecemeal sale.
The management of Mirage has full knowledge of the case facts pre-
sented above and therefore has a ﬁrst-mover advantage. Bizbank will
observe the payment default by Mirage tomorrow. However, the bank
does not know whether Mirage’s bad luck is likely to be prolonged. That
information will be available only in the annual report published in 3
months’ time. Shareholders, suppliers, the tax administration, and em-
ployees will become aware of the situation when they have access to the
annual report.
As this description illustrates, our case is relatively simple and abstracts
from a number of issues that have been the focus of bankruptcy schol-
arship in recent years. First, we focus on formal insolvency proceedings
and ignore informal workouts (Gilson, John, and Lang 1990; Asquith,
Gertner, and Scharfstein 1994). Claessens and Klapper (2005) ﬁnd that
workouts are common in countries with concentrated banking rela-
tionships; Franks and Lo ´ra ´nth (2005) have a similar ﬁnding for Hun-
gary, where bankruptcy is highly inefﬁcient. However, workouts often
fail and are more likely to fail when, as with Bizbank, there are multiple
unsecured creditors.
Second, the security on which Mirage defaults is straight debt; by
assumption we do not allow complex ﬁnancial structures that can permit
Mirage to circumvent formal bankruptcy. Some of the problems we
discuss can be avoided with convertible debt, for example, although
such debt does not deal with the difﬁculties posed by unsecured cred-
itors and hence does not take care of central issues of our case. Recent
research shows that ﬁnancial contracts indeed adjust to the legal en-
vironment but also that judges in poor countries often fail to enforce
them (Lerner and Schoar 2005; Gennaioli and Rossi 2007; Qian and
Strahan 2007).
Third, as advised by bankruptcy specialists from developing countries,
we have only one senior secured creditor (along with employees, sup-
pliers, and the government, which are unsecured). More complex cap-
ital structures, which we are advised are uncommon for midsize ﬁrms,
would create further complications (Bebchuk 1988; Gertner and Scharf-
stein 1991; Aghion, Hart, and Moore 1992; Bolton and Scharfstein 1996;
Stromberg 2000; Berglof, Roland, and von Thadden 2007).
Fourth, we assume that the creditor knows from the start that pres-
ervation as a going concern is efﬁcient for Mirage. One argument for1112 journal of political economy
court-supervised bankruptcy is that such knowledge is unavailable, and
bankruptcy facilitates the discovery of the efﬁcient disposition.
Fifth, the hotel does not require any additional ﬁnancing to continue
operations; its problem is the inability to pay the outstanding debt. This
assumption may bias the results in favor of foreclosure since one reason
for bankruptcy protection is to allow the ﬁrm to raise additional ﬁnance,
something it does not need to do in our case.
Sixth, the hotel is small and not important enough for politicians or
judges to try to keep it going “in the public interest.” Politicization of
bankruptcy is also an important concern (Weiss and Wruck 1998; Chang
and Schoar 2007; Lambert-Moglianski, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya 2007).
Seventh, our case facts explicitly rule out tunneling of the hotel’s
assets during debt enforcement. In the developing countries in partic-
ular, tunneling of the ﬁrm by the controlling shareholder may present
a major problem for creditors, creating pressure for a quick piecemeal
sale (Johnson et al. 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa
2003; Gennaioli and Rossi 2007). This means that some institutional
arrangements, such as automatically shutting down a ﬁrm during in-
solvency proceedings, will perform extremely badly under our no tun-
neling assumption but make sense if keeping the ﬁrm alive encourages
the diversion of assets. On the other hand, complex bankruptcy pro-
cedures might work even worse with tunneling than without.
III. Data
A. Procedures
The legal procedures that respondents choose as the most likely option
for resolving Mirage’s insolvency include foreclosure, liquidation, and
reorganization. Each procedure can lead either to Mirage continuing
operation as a going concern or to its piecemeal sale (ﬁg. 1).
Foreclosure is a debt enforcement procedure aimed at recovering
money owed to secured creditors. Foreclosure does not protect unse-
cured creditors, who must rely on separate insolvency proceedings to
recover the amounts owed them. In some countries, an insolvent com-
pany (or unsecured creditors) can cause a stay of foreclosure proceed-
ings by initiating a reorganization or liquidation procedure, whereas in
other countries, a reorganization or liquidation ﬁling does not stop
foreclosure. In the latter case, liquidation procedures may take place
in tandem with or after foreclosure.
Foreclosure can be an entirely out-of-court procedure, in which a
receiver steers the company to a sale of assets (either piecemeal or as
a going concern). Indeed, the appointment of such a receiver can be
part of the debt contract. In other countries, a court oversees foreclo-debt enforcement around the world 1113
Fig. 1.—Procedures and outcomes
sure, although it is typically less involved than in bankruptcy. Some
countries allow a creditor to take security over an entire business—often
known as a “ﬂoating charge.”
5 Under our case facts, foreclosure under
a ﬂoating charge gives Bizbank socially optimal incentives to dispose of
Mirage. In other countries, Mirage as a business is not legally valid
collateral, which obviously distorts Bizbank’s incentives.
Liquidation is the procedure of winding up a company under court
supervision.
6 In principle, it may lead to a sale of Mirage as a going
concern and does not necessarily result in the piecemeal sale of its assets.
Reorganization is a court-supervised procedure aimed at rehabilitat-
ing companies in ﬁnancial distress. It is not available in all countries.
Reorganization protects the company while it attempts to rehabilitate
itself; once reorganization begins, creditors generally may not enforce
their claims against the company. The current management of Mirage
may or may not retain control of the company during reorganization.
In some instances, as is the case with Chapter 7 and 11 proceedings
in the United States, liquidation and reorganization are separate pro-
cedures. A petitioner must choose between the two. In other countries,
there exists a single insolvency procedure, and the company may be
directed either to the liquidation or to the reorganization “track.”
Regardless of the nature of the reorganization procedure, in many
5 We use the term “ﬂoating charge” when the assets of the entire business canbepledged
as collateral. Countries use different terms for this concept, including “enterprise mort-
gage,” “enterprise charge,” or “pledge of business.” In the United Kingdom, “ﬂoating
charge” can be used more narrowly, for instance, by excluding inventory from the pool
of pledged assets, but it is still possible to pledge the assets of an entire business.
6 We consider here compulsory liquidation, where either a creditor ﬁles a liquidation
petition or the law requires that an insolvent debtor ﬁle the same petition under certain
circumstances. Another process, voluntary liquidation not required by law, is outside the
scope of our study.1114 journal of political economy
countries Mirage may still end up in liquidation after an initial attempt
at reorganization.
B. Responses
We present the case to respondents and ﬁrst ask them to outline the
procedures available by law in the case of Mirage. They then indicate
which legal procedure is most likely to be followed in the case of Mi-
rage—given their experience, their country’s laws, and the assumptions
of the case study. Respondents explain which procedure is chosen and
which party—Bizbank, Mirage, or another—selects it. Mirage has a ﬁrst-
mover advantage since its management knows it will default. In countries
in which a debtor can seek relief from enforcement by unilaterally ap-
plying for reorganization, Mirage is likely to initiate a reorganization
proceeding since management wishes it to continue as a going concern.
In countries in which liquidation and reorganization do not automat-
ically stay foreclosure proceedings and foreclosure is faster and cheaper
than other procedures, Bizbank will initiate foreclosure. In countries in
which Mirage’s ﬁnancial position (it has negative net worth and is in
default) automatically triggers liquidation, liquidation is the most likely
procedure.
In the United States, for example, Mirage will successfully apply for
Chapter 11 reorganization. Reorganization imposes an automatic stay
on enforcement and offers the best chance of keeping the ﬁrm in op-
eration and current management in control. Mirage’s ﬁrst-mover ad-
vantage allows it to take this course of action. In the United Kingdom,
our respondent reported that Bizbank retains the right to appoint an
administrative receiver under a foreclosure measure because its security
was granted before the effective date of the Enterprise Act, 2002. Ad-
ministrative receivership mainly beneﬁts the secured creditor; if the
security had taken effect after the effective date of the Enterprise Act,
Bizbank would not have been able to appoint an administrative receiver
and Mirage would have appointed an administrator, with the goal of
preserving it as a going concern. In Greece, commencement of reor-
ganization requires the consent of 60 percent of all creditors, including
at least 40 percent of secured creditors, so reorganization is possible
only with Bizbank’s consent. Bizbank is unlikely to offer such consent
because suppliers to Mirage in reorganization will become senior to
Bizbank. Enforcement of the security right by Bizbank is also possible
in Greece but expensive. Our survey shows that liquidation is the most
likely choice and that Mirage is likely to be sold piecemeal.
We also ask respondents to describe how the insolvency process
evolves in the most likely scenario under the assumptions of the case.
They describe the main sequence of steps and associated time from thedebt enforcement around the world 1115
moment of ﬁling until the payment of all parties, including the main
points of delay such as appeals. In Singapore, for example, there are
eight main steps to the insolvency case. First, Bizbank would issue a
formal demand for the monies due under the security, normally within
14 days. Since Mirage is unable to pay, Bizbank would then appoint a
receiver to manage Mirage, who would assume control of the business
with an objective to sell it as a going concern and recover the debt owed
to Bizbank. This step typically takes 4 weeks. Marketing submissions are
received and analyzed (requiring 2 weeks), and a marketing program
agreed and implemented (5 weeks). Negotiations with interested parties
and execution of the contract of sale for Mirage take place (4 weeks),
followed by completion of the contract of sale (12 weeks). Unsecured
creditors are likely to appeal the matter on the grounds that the sale
price is not reasonable, delaying the proceedings by 2 months assuming
that there is no real evidence to support their challenge (as under the
facts of the case). Funds are disbursed and ﬁnal reports are prepared
(3 weeks).
Respondents predict whether Mirage continues operating as a going
concern after the resolution of the case and justify their choice with
written arguments. In Italy, for example, reorganization plans may be
approved by the court only if 40 percent of unsecured creditor debt is
satisﬁed in the plan and 100 percent of secured creditor debt is satisﬁed
in the plan. Since the value of Mirage is exactly equal to the amount
owed Bizbank but is not enough to satisfy unsecured creditors, the
reorganization plan is not accepted and the ﬁrm is automatically sold
piecemeal. In the Czech Republic, the administrator is paid more for
each sale that is conducted, thus increasing the incentive for a piecemeal
sale.
Finally, respondents estimate the cost of the proceeding borne by all
parties. These costs include court fees, attorney fees, notiﬁcation fees,
publication fees, administrator fees, assessor and inspector fees, asset
storage and preservation costs, liquidation/auctioneer fees, government
fees/levies, and other fees respondents are asked to describe. In most
countries, the largest component of costs is attorney fees.
C. Main Variables
Table 1 deﬁnes the variables used in the analysis. Four main variables
are recorded from survey responses. First, we document the time to
resolve the insolvency process. Time covers the period from the moment
that Mirage defaults until its fate is realized: it is kept as a going concern
or sold piecemeal. Time includes all delays from disputed claims and
appeals that are likely given the assumptions of the case study. In some
countries, Bizbank is not paid immediately when the insolvency process1116
TABLE 1
Description of the Variables
Variable Description
A. Main variables:
Foreclosure p 1 if Mirage is most likely to undergo a foreclosure
or similar debt enforcement proceeding, 0
otherwise
Liquidation p 1 if Mirage is most likely to undergo a liquidation
proceeding, 0 otherwise
Reorganization p 1 if Mirage is most likely to undergo a reorganiza-
tion proceeding, 0 otherwise
Time Estimated duration, in years, of the time to resolve
the insolvency case of Mirage; measures the dura-
tion from the moment of Mirage’s default to the
point at which the fate of Mirage is determined,
i.e., when Mirage is either sold as a going concern,
sold piecemeal, or successfully reorganized
Time to payment Estimated duration, in years, of the time from the
moment of Mirage’s default to the point at which
the secured creditor receives payment
Cost Estimated cost of the debt enforcement proceeding
for Mirage, reported as a percentage of the value
of the estate, borne by all parties; costs include
court/bankruptcy authority costs, attorney fees,
bankruptcy administrator fees, accountant fees, no-
tiﬁcation and publication fees, assessor or inspector
fees, asset storage and preservation costs, auction-
eer fees, government levies, and other associated
insolvency costs
Going concern p 1 if Mirage continues operating as a going con-
cern both throughout and upon completion of the
insolvency process, 0 otherwise
Lending rates The bank lending rate to the private sector (source:
International Monetary Fund’s International Finan-
cial Statistics [IFS] online database, line 60P.ZF):
line 60P.ZF is deﬁned as the “bank rate that usually
meets the short and medium term ﬁnancing needs
of the private sector” (in cases in which lending
rates are not reported in the IFS, we obtain data
directly from central banks)
Legal origin A dummy variable that identiﬁes the legal origin of
the bankruptcy law of each country (the four ori-
gins are English, French, German and Nordic)
GDP per capita Logarithm of gross national income per capita (Atlas
method), 2004 (source: World Development Indica-
tors 2005)
B. Characteristics of the
insolvency system:
Statutory time limits on
appeals
p 1 if there are time limits that restrict the duration
of any appeal of the judgment by any party, 0
otherwise
Out-of-court seizure and
sale
p 1 if the secured creditor may seize and sell its col-
lateral without court approval, judgment, or en-
forcement; p 0 if court approval, judgment, or en-
forcement is required to enforce security1117
TABLE 1
(Continued)
Variable Description
No judgment for
enforcement
p 1 if the secured creditor may enforce its security
in either an enforcement court or an out-of-court
procedure, without ﬁrst obtaining a judgment au-
thorizing it to do so; p 0 if a court judgment is re-
quired before proceeding to enforcement
Floating charge p 1 if the assets of the entire business can be
pledged as collateral, 0 otherwise
Specialized court p 1 where the authority with jurisidiction in the case
of Mirage is either a specialized bankruptcy court
or a specialized bankruptcy administrative authority,
0 otherwise; a specialized bankruptcy court would
generally have jurisdiction over liquidation and re-
organization, but not foreclosure/debt enforce-
ment proceedings
Case proceeds on
appeal of insolvency
p 1 if the insolvency case is not automatically sus-
pended upon appeal of the order initiating the in-
solvency process or if the insolvency order cannot
be appealed at all; p 0 if the case is suspended un-
til resolution of the appeal
Same judge for appeal
of insolvency
p 1 if an appeal of the initiation of the insolvency
case is handled by the same judge supervising the
insolvency case; p 0 if the appeal is heard by a dif-
ferent judge in an appeals court
Case proceeds on
appeal of liquidation
p 1 if a sale in liquidation is executed even on ap-
peal of the liquidation order or if the liquidation
order cannot be appealed at all; p 0 if the case is
suspended until resolution of the appeal
Same judge for appeal
of liquidation
p 1 if an appeal of the order to liquidate Mirage is
handled by the same judge supervising the insol-
vency case; p 0 if the appeal is heard by a differ-
ent judge in an appeals court
Case proceeds on claim
amount dispute
p 1 if the insolvency case is not automatically sus-
pended when a creditor disputes a claim amount
or if the claim amount cannot be appealed at all; p
0 if the case is suspended until resolution of the
appeal
Same judge for claim
amount dispute
p 1 if an appeal of the amount of the claim is han-
dled by the same judge supervising the insolvency
case; p 0 if the appeal is heard by a different
judge in an appeals court
Reorganization attempt
required
p 1 if by law Mirage must ﬁrst attempt reorganiza-
tion before proceeding to liquidation; p 0i fi ti s
possible for Mirage to enter liquidation ﬁrst
Automatic stay on
enforcement
p 1 if the secured creditor may not enforce its secu-
rity against Mirage upon commencement of the in-
solvency proceedings, 0 otherwise
Automatic stay on
lawsuits
p 1 if lawsuits against Mirage are automatically
stayed upon commencement of insolvency proceed-
ings, 0 otherwise
Firm must cease
operating
p 1 if Mirage must cease operations upon com-
mencement or during the insolvency proceedings,
0 otherwise
Contracts may be
rescinded
p 1 if suppliers and customers may rescind contracts
with Mirage without penalty upon the initiation of
insolvency proceedings, 0 otherwiseTABLE 1
(Continued)
Variable Description
Restrictions on
dismissals
p 1 if Mirage is restricted from dismissing employees
upon the initiation of insolvency proceedings, 0
otherwise
Management remains p 1 if management remains in control of decisions
in the ordinary course of business during the reso-
lution of the insolvency proceeding; p 0 if man-
agement is automatically dismissed or must be su-
pervised or seek approval from the insolvency
administrator or court for decisions in the ordinary
course of business
Creditor approves
administrator
p 1 if the secured creditor has the right to approve
the appointment of the insolvency administrator; p
0 if only the court, the debtor, and/or other partic-
ipants appoint the administrator
Creditor dismisses
administrator
p 1 if the secured creditor may dismiss or must ap-
prove the dismissal of the insolvency administrator;
p 0 if only the court, the debtor, and/or other
participants dismiss the administrator
Administrator paid on
market value
p 1 if the insolvency administrator is remunerated
on the basis of the market value of the insolvency
estate; p 0 if the insolvency administrator is remu-
nerated on the basis of the book value of assets or
on a daily rate
Automatic trigger for
liquidation
p 1 if an “automatic trigger” mechanism can initiate
insolvency; an automatic trigger is deﬁned as a set
of circumstances—such as on the period of default
or ratio of assets to liabilities—under which Mirage
must by law apply for insolvency proceedings
Proof of reorganization
prospects
p 1 if Mirage must submit proof of reorganization
prospects before reorganization proceedings may
commence; p 0 if Mirage may commence reorgan-
ization proceedings without evidence that the pro-
cedure may be successful
Creditors vote directly p 1 if secured creditors vote directly on the reorgan-
ization plan; p 0 if secured creditors vote in com-
mittee or not at all
C. Other variables:
Creditor rights Index aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta
et al. (1998); the index ranges from 0 to 4 (source:
Djankov et al. 2007)
Information sharing p 1 if either a public credit registry or a private
credit bureau operates in the country, 0 otherwise
(source: Djankov et al. 2007)
Private credit/GDP Ratio of credit from deposit-taking ﬁnancial institu-
tions to the private sector (IFS lines 22d and 42d)
to GDP (IFS line 99b; source: IMF IFS database)
GDP Logarithm of gross national product (current U.S.
dollars), average 2002–4 (source: World Develop-
ment Indicators 2005)
GDP per capita growth Average annual growth in gross domestic product per
capita from 1980 to 2004 (source: World Develop-
ment Indicators 2005)debt enforcement around the world 1119
TABLE 1
(Continued)
Variable Description
Contract enforcement
days
Number of days to resolve a payment dispute through
courts; data are based on the methodology in Djan-
kov, LaPorta, et al. (2003) but describe the number
of calendar days to enforce a contract of unpaid
debt worth 50% of the country’s GDP per capita;
the variable is constructed as at January 2003.
(source: Djankov, La Porta, et al. 2003).
is resolved. Accordingly, we also deﬁne time to payment as the time
from default until Bizbank is paid. Of course, time is relevant for com-
puting the efﬁciency of debt enforcement, whereas time to payment is
relevant for computing Bizbank’s recovery rate (Davydenko and Franks
2008). Time and time to payment are reported in years.
Next, we record the cost to complete the insolvency proceeding, ex-
pressed as a percentage of the bankruptcy estate at the time of entry
into bankruptcy. The bankruptcy estate is the greater of the going con-
cern and piecemeal sale values, which is 100.
Third, we create a dummy variable, GC, equal to one if Mirage con-
tinues operating as a going concern (the efﬁcient outcome here), upon
completion of the insolvency process, and to zero if Mirage is sold
piecemeal.
To assess the efﬁciency of each procedure, we need to make two
additional assumptions that are not covered in the responses we have
received. First, we need to make an assumption as to whether the cost
of debt enforcement is incurred at the beginning or at the end. We
assume that it is incurred at the end, which gives an advantage to rel-
atively poor countries with high interest rates and costs. Second, we
need to make an assumption as to the value Mirage generates while in
debt enforcement proceedings. We assume that Mirage just covers its
variable costs and generates no value during the insolvency process.
This assumption holds regardless of whether Mirage operates as a going
concern during the insolvency process or is closed down. This assump-
tion obviously makes bankruptcy costlier for the poorer countries, with
longer durations of proceedings and higher interest rates. In Section
IV, we examine the robustness of our results with respect to changing
each of these two assumptions.
Under these assumptions, we calculate a measure of efﬁciency, de-
ﬁned as the present value of the terminal value of the ﬁrm after bank-
ruptcy costs, or
100 # GC 70 # (1  GC)  100 # c
E p .( 1 ) t (1  r)1120 journal of political economy
Here GC equals one if Mirage continues as a going concern and zero
otherwise, c is the cost, t is the time to resolve insolvency, and r is the
nominal lending rate. Throughout, we examine the robustness of the
results to assuming the same 8 percent rate for all countries.
We organize the data by income levels and the legal origin of a coun-
try’s bankruptcy laws. Legal origin is obtained from a study of the origin
of bankruptcy laws. There are four main insolvency legal origins: En-
glish, French, German, and Nordic. The coding is similar to the general
commercial legal origin reported in La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), with
some exceptions. For example, the commercial and company laws in
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are based on English
laws, but their bankruptcy laws are of French tradition—via France,
Egypt, and Kuwait, respectively. Although Japan and Korea are of
German commercial legal origin, their bankruptcy codes are based on
English law. Switzerland, Russia, and Bulgaria base their bankruptcy laws
on the French tradition; their commercial laws are of German origin.
In addition, we surveyed respondents on priority rules in bankruptcy
(Sec. V) and on a range of structural features of the bankruptcy system
(Sec. VI). The former come from responses to questions on the type
of courts with jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases, rules on appeals in
bankruptcy, restrictions on available bankruptcy procedures, rules to
keep the business operating as a going concern, and information on
which participants control the bankruptcy process. Twenty-four of these
questions for which we have adequate answers (and which are relevant
for our case) were coded for the analysis. These variables were veriﬁed
from the available laws and public information.
IV. Basic Results
We begin by noting the most basic features of the data. On average, the
insolvency of Mirage takes 2.64 years to resolve, costs 14 percent of the
estate, and preserves Mirage as a going concern in only 36 percent of
the cases. The worldwide average efﬁciency measure is 51.97 percent,
which means that almost half of Mirage’s value is lost in debt enforce-
ment. The fact that in our simple case—with one senior creditor, known
going concern and piecemeal sale values, and no tunneling—half the
value is lost in enforcement reinforces the common concern about the
efﬁciency of bankruptcy.
There is tremendous variation among countries in time, cost, and
efﬁciency. In 14 countries (all of them rich), insolvency takes less than
a year to resolve, but in nine (mostly poor), it takes more than 5 years.
The costs are not enormous on average, but in seven countries, typically
those with very long proceedings, they consume over 30 percent of the
estate, with the dominant cost being attorney fees. In Singapore, Neth-debt enforcement around the world 1121
erlands, and Japan, our respondents indicate that only about 5 percent
of the estate is wasted in debt enforcement. In Turkey and Angola, less
than 7 percent of the estate is left, in present value terms, by the end
of debt enforcement.
Given the large number of assumptions we made to arrive at these
estimates of duration, cost, and efﬁciency, can we argue that they are
plausible? We have pointed out already that the key case facts were
developed jointly with bankruptcy practitioners in both rich and de-
veloping countries to make the case representative. An alternative way
to consider plausibility is to correlate our estimates with other measures
of efﬁciency of debt enforcement. Djankov, LaPorta, et al. (2003), using
a very different methodology, propose a measure of formalism of judicial
procedure, which is a measure of the regulation of legal proceedings
for the collection of a bounced check. The authors show that formalism
is a strong predictor of the inefﬁciency of the legal process. The cor-
relation between the formalism measure and this paper’s measure of
efﬁciency of debt enforcement is .522, with a p-value of .000. The fact
that the two measures of efﬁciency of debt collection are so highly
correlated despite being collected so differently is some indication of
validity. In Section VII, we show that our measure of efﬁciency predicts
debt market development, a further bit of evidence that our measure
is plausible.
As a next step, we consider some of the determinants of time, cost,
and efﬁciency of debt enforcement for our case facts. In table 2, coun-
tries are independently divided into three per capita income categories
(high, upper-middle, and lower-middle income) and three categories
based on the likely procedure to be used to enforce Mirage’s debt
(foreclosure, liquidation, and reorganization). Each of the nine groups
lists the countries that fall into that group and for each country the
time and cost of its procedure, the expected outcome (whether the ﬁrm
continues as a going concern), the lending rate, and the summary ef-
ﬁciency measure. We also report the average for each income/proce-
dure group, as well as the average of each variable by income group
and by procedure.
The most basic ﬁndings of table 2 can be gleaned by looking at
averages by procedure and by income. Countries are roughly evenly
divided between those most likely to use foreclosure, liquidation, and
reorganization to deal with Mirage, with reorganization a somewhat
larger category than the other two. When we average across all countries
using a particular procedure, there is no evidence that any procedure
is always superior to others for our case facts. This is particularly inter-
esting since, in our context, foreclosure in theory yields the ﬁrst best.
The question of appropriate debt enforcement rules cannot be resolved
at such a broad level.1122
TABLE 2
Data by Procedure and Income Group
Country Time Cost (%) GC Interest Efﬁciency
A. High-Income Group
Foreclosure
Singapore .58 1 1 5.3 96.1
United Kingdom .50 6 1 3.7 92.3
New Zealand .67 4 1 9.8 90.7
Hong Kong, China .63 9 1 5.0 88.3
Australia .58 8 1 8.4 87.8
Kuwait 4.00 1 0 5.4 55.9
Slovenia 1.67 8 0 10.8 52.3
United Arab Emirates 4.96 38 0 8.1 21.8
Average 1.70 9 .63 7.05 73.13
Liquidation
Netherlands 1.42 1 1 3.0 94.9
Sweden 1.00 9 1 5.8 86.0
Austria .92 18 1 5.6 78.0
Denmark 2.50 9 1 7.1 76.7
Israel 1.50 23 1 10.7 66.2
Germany .92 8 0 9.7 57.0
Greece 1.92 9 0 6.8 53.8
Average 1.45 11 .71 6.96 73.21
Reorganization
Japan .58 4 1 1.8 95.5
Taiwan, China .83 4 1 3.4 93.8
Canada .75 4 1 4.7 93.2
Finland .92 4 1 4.8 92.4
Norway .92 1 1 8.5 91.8
Belgium .92 4 1 6.9 90.8
Ireland .42 9 1 2.9 89.9
Korea, Republic 1.50 4 1 6.2 88.1
United States 2.00 7 1 4.1 85.8
Portugal 2.00 9 1 5.2 82.3
Spain 1.00 15 1 4.3 82.0
Puerto Rico 3.79 8 1 4.7 77.4
Switzerland 3.00 4 0 3.3 60.4
France 1.89 9 0 6.6 54.1
Italy 1.17 22 0 5.0 45.3
Average 1.45 7 .80 4.83 81.52
High-income average 1.51 9 .73 5.92 77.3
B. Upper-Middle Income
Foreclosure
Oman 2.75 4 0 8.2 53.5
Hungary 1.88 15 0 9.6 46.7
Croatia 1.92 15 0 11.6 45.0
Panama 2.00 18 0 9.9 43.0
Chile 5.08 15 0 6.2 40.9
Lebanon 4.00 22 0 13.4 29.0
Uruguay 1.92 7 0 50.9 28.6
Average 2.79 13 .00 15.70 40.971123
TABLE 2
(Continued)
Country Time Cost (%) GC Interest Efﬁciency
Liquidation
Botswana 1.33 15 1 16.6 69.7
Poland 2.00 22 1 7.3 67.7
Slovak Republic 4.08 18 1 8.5 58.9
Lithuania 1.25 7 0 5.8 58.7
Estonia 2.00 9 0 5.5 54.8
Latvia 2.75 13 0 5.4 49.3
Malaysia 2.25 15 0 6.3 48.4
Czech Republic 6.00 15 0 5.3 40.7
Saudi Arabia 2.71 22 0 6.4 40.6
Venezuela, RB 3.96 38 0 25.2 13.1
Average 2.83 17 .30 9.23 50.20
Reorganization
Mexico 1.83 18 1 6.9 72.6
Argentina 2.75 12 0 19.2 35.8
Costa Rica 3.50 15 0 25.6 25.0
Average 2.69 15 .33 17.21 44.46
Upper-middle-income average 2.80 16 .20 12.69 46.1
C. Lower-Middle Income
Foreclosure
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.83 9 1 10.3 76.1
Jamaica 1.00 18 1 18.9 69.0
Armenia 1.58 4 0 18.6 50.4
Sri Lanka 1.42 18 0 9.5 45.7
China 1.79 22 0 5.6 43.6
El Salvador 3.67 9 0 14.0 37.8
Honduras 2.88 8 0 19.9 36.8
Guatemala 3.00 15 0 15.0 36.5
Georgia 2.83 4 0 31.2 30.8
Paraguay 3.92 9 0 50.0 12.5
Average 2.39 12 .20 19.29 43.90
Liquidation
Jordan 3.25 9 0 10.2 44.5
Albania 3.50 38 1 11.8 42.0
South Africa 1.92 18 0 15.0 39.8
Russian Federation 3.67 9 0 13.0 39.0
Syrian Arab Republic 5.42 9 0 9.0 38.2
Kazakhstan 2.83 18 0 19.5 31.4
Egypt, Arab Republic 4.08 22 0 13.5 28.6
Brazil 3.67 12 1 67.1 13.4
Dominican Republic 3.33 38 0 31.4 12.9
Average 3.52 19 .22 21.15 32.20
Reorganization
Colombia 3.00 1 1 15.2 64.8
Tunisia 1.25 7 0 9.0 56.6
Thailand 2.67 36 1 5.9 54.9
Algeria 3.50 7 0 8.0 48.1
Bulgaria 3.33 9 0 8.8 46.0
Namibia 1.50 15 0 14.7 45.21124 journal of political economy
TABLE 2
(Continued)
Country Time Cost (%) GC Interest Efﬁciency
Morocco 1.83 18 0 12.6 41.9
Peru 3.08 7 0 14.2 41.8
Iran, Islamic Republic 4.50 9 0 17.5 29.5
Serbia and Montenegro 2.67 23 0 21.0 28.3
Macedonia, former Yugoslav
republic 3.67 28 0 12.4 27.3
Indonesia 5.50 18 0 14.1 25.1
Belarus 5.75 22 0 16.9 19.5
Ecuador 8.00 18 0 13.1 19.4
Ukraine 2.92 42 0 17.4 17.5
Philippines 5.67 38 0 11.2 17.5
Romania 4.58 9 0 45.4 11.0
Turkey 5.88 7 0 46.7 6.6
Angola 6.17 22 0 82.3 1.2
Average 3.97 18 .11 20.34 31.70
Lower-middle-income average 3.45 16 .16 20.257 35.0
Average by procedure:
Foreclosure 2.28 11 .28 14.37 52.44
Liquidation 2.70 16 .38 12.74 50.16
Reorganization 2.84 13 .41 13.80 52.93
Note.—The table presents country data organized by both income and the debt enforcement procedure that applies
in the case. For each country the table shows the time and cost of debt enforcement proceedings, an indicator of
whether Mirage is expected to continue as a going concern, the lending rate, and the efﬁciency of debt enforcement.
Table 1 describes the variables in detail.
If we compare income groups, in contrast, enormous differences
emerge. The richer countries are vastly more efﬁcient at debt enforce-
ment than the poorer ones. If we average over all the procedures, the
richest countries take 1.5 years to resolve debt enforcement, at a trans-
action cost of 9 percent of the estate. They preserve Mirage as a going
concern in 73 percent of the cases, have an average interest rate of 5.9
percent, and achieve the average efﬁciency score of 77.3. The corre-
sponding numbers for upper-middle-income countries are 2.80 years,
16 percent of the estate, only 20 percent of the cases preserving Mirage
as a going concern, an interest rate of 12.7 percent, and the average
efﬁciency score of 46.1. For the lower-middle-income countries the time
is 3.45 years, the cost is again 16 percent, the going concern outcome
also materializes in 16 percent of the cases, the interest rate is 20.3
percent, and the efﬁciency score is 35 on average. The decline in the
efﬁciency score compared to upper-middle-income countries comes
from higher interest rates and longer delays in the lower-middle-income
countries. Clearly, per capita income is a crucial determinant both of
getting the right outcome and of the overall efﬁciency of debt
enforcement.
There are several potential reasons for the fourfold difference be-
tween the rich and the middle-income countries in efﬁciently preservingdebt enforcement around the world 1125
Mirage as a going concern. One possibility is the difference in admin-
istrative or judicial competence, which causes lower-middle-income
countries to nearly always fail at rehabilitation (Ayotte and Yun 2009).
Alternatively, successful rehabilitation may require a good deal of se-
curity of Bizbank’s property rights, which cannot be guaranteed in
middle-income countries (Gennaioli and Rossi 2007). If suppliers, cus-
tomers, employees, management, or Mr. Douglas can lay claims on Mi-
rage’s assets during rehabilitation (or even tunnel them), Bizbank has
a very strong incentive to grab what it can and sell it piecemeal.
Per capita income does not explain everything, however. Some rich
countries, such as United Arab Emirates and Italy, have hugely inefﬁ-
cient debt enforcement. Some lower-middle-income countries, such as
Bosnia, Jamaica, and Colombia, do pretty well. Nonetheless, debt en-
forcement joins the list of many other public, as well as private, activities
in which per capita income predicts efﬁciency.
Per capita income is a strong predictor of both the going concern
outcome and efﬁciency for every procedure. The rich countries are the
most efﬁcient at foreclosure, liquidation, and reorganization; the upper-
middle-income countries are roughly as efﬁcient as the lower-middle-
income ones at foreclosure and reorganization and sharply more efﬁ-
cient at liquidation. The basic ﬁnding is not a procedure composition
effect.
A closer look reveals an interesting pattern in table 2. Among high-
income countries, foreclosure is roughly as efﬁcient as liquidation, but
reorganization is the most efﬁcient procedure. The main reason is that
reorganization preserves Mirage as a going concern 80 percent of the
time, compared to 63 percent for foreclosure and 71 percent for li-
quidation. Among the lower-middle-income countries, reorganization is
roughly as efﬁcient as liquidation, but foreclosure is the most efﬁcient
procedure. These countries rarely manage to save Mirage as a going
concern, so speed and lower cost are conducive to efﬁciency. For upper-
middle-income countries, the most efﬁcient procedure is liquidation.
Overall, the richer countries are doing better at procedures involving
higher levels of court intervention.
Table 3 presents the same data as table 2, except countries are or-
ganized by procedure and legal origin rather than procedure and per
capita income. Several results stand out. First, relative to general world
patterns, French legal origin countries rely particularly heavily on re-
organization of Mirage and German legal origin countries on liquida-
tion—the latter being a familiar result. None of the four Nordic coun-
tries utilizes foreclosure. The Nordic countries achieve very high
efﬁciency, largely because they always succeed in keeping Mirage as a
going concern (and are very fast). Some of this efﬁciency undoubtedly
comes from being rich.1126
TABLE 3
Data by Procedure and Legal Origin
Country Time Cost (%) GC Interest Efﬁciency
A. Common Law
Foreclosure
Singapore .58 1 1 5.3 96.1
United Kingdom .50 6 1 3.7 92.3
New Zealand .67 4 1 9.8 90.7
Hong Kong, China .63 9 1 5.0 88.3
Australia .58 8 1 8.4 87.8
Jamaica 1.00 18 1 18.9 69.0
Sri Lanka 1.42 18 0 9.5 45.7
Average .77 9 .86 8.65 81.40
Liquidation
Botswana 1.33 15 1 16.6 69.7
Israel 1.50 23 1 10.7 66.2
Malaysia 2.25 15 0 6.3 48.4
South Africa 1.92 18 0 15.0 39.8
Average 1.75 18 .50 12.12 56.01
Reorganization
Japan .58 4 1 1.8 95.5
Canada .75 4 1 4.7 93.2
Ireland .42 9 1 2.9 89.9
Korea, Republic 1.50 4 1 6.2 88.1
United States 2.00 7 1 4.1 85.8
Puerto Rico 3.79 8 1 4.7 77.4
Thailand 2.67 36 1 5.9 54.9
Namibia 1.50 15 0 14.7 45.2
Philippines 5.67 38 0 11.2 17.5
Average 2.10 14 .78 6.25 71.95
Common law average 1.56 13 .75 8.3 72.1
B. French Legal Origin
Foreclosure
Kuwait 4.00 1 0 5.4 55.9
Oman 2.75 4 0 8.2 53.5
Panama 2.00 18 0 9.9 43.0
Chile 5.08 15 0 6.2 40.9
El Salvador 3.67 9 0 14.0 37.8
Honduras 2.88 8 0 19.9 36.8
Guatemala 3.00 15 0 15.0 36.5
Lebanon 4.00 22 0 13.4 29.0
Uruguay 1.92 7 0 50.9 28.6
United Arab Emirates 4.96 38 0 8.1 21.8
Paraguay 3.92 9 0 50.0 12.5
Average 3.47 13 .00 18.27 36.03
Liquidation
Netherlands 1.42 1 1 3.0 94.9
Greece 1.92 9 0 6.8 53.8
Jordan 3.25 9 0 10.2 44.5
Saudi Arabia 2.71 22 0 6.4 40.6
Russian Federation 3.67 9 0 13.0 39.0
Syrian Arab Republic 5.42 9 0 9.0 38.21127
TABLE 3
(Continued)
Country Time Cost (%) GC Interest Efﬁciency
Egypt, Arab Republic 4.08 22 0 13.5 28.6
Brazil 3.67 12 1 67.1 13.4
Venezuela, RB 3.96 38 0 25.2 13.1
Dominican Republic 3.33 38 0 31.4 12.9
Average 3.34 17 .20 18.55 37.91
Reorganization
Belgium .92 4 1 6.9 90.8
Portugal 2.00 9 1 5.2 82.3
Spain 1.00 15 1 4.3 82.0
Mexico 1.83 18 1 6.9 72.6
Colombia 3.00 1 1 15.2 64.8
Switzerland 3.00 4 0 3.3 60.4
Tunisia 1.25 7 0 9.0 56.6
France 1.89 9 0 6.6 54.1
Algeria 3.50 7 0 8.0 48.1
Bulgaria 3.33 9 0 8.8 46.0
Italy 1.17 22 0 5.0 45.3
Morocco 1.83 18 0 12.6 41.9
Peru 3.08 7 0 14.2 41.8
Argentina 2.75 12 0 19.2 35.8
Iran, Islamic Republic 4.50 9 0 17.5 29.5
Indonesia 5.50 18 0 14.1 25.1
Costa Rica 3.50 15 0 25.6 25.0
Belarus 5.75 22 0 16.9 19.5
Ecuador 8.00 18 0 13.1 19.4
Romania 4.58 9 0 45.4 11.0
Turkey 5.88 7 0 46.7 6.6
Angola 6.17 22 0 82.3 1.2
Average 3.38 12 .23 17.58 43.63
French legal origin average 3.40 13 .16 18.0 40.4
C. German Legal Origin
Foreclosure
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.83 9 1 10.3 76.1
Slovenia 1.67 8 0 10.8 52.3
Armenia 1.58 4 0 18.6 50.4
Hungary 1.88 15 0 9.6 46.7
Croatia 1.92 15 0 11.6 45.0
China 1.79 22 0 5.6 43.6
Georgia 2.83 4 0 31.2 30.8
Average 1.93 11 .14 13.95 49.25
Liquidation
Austria .92 18 1 5.6 78.0
Poland 2.00 22 1 7.3 67.7
Slovak Republic 4.08 18 1 8.5 58.9
Lithuania 1.25 7 0 5.8 58.7
Germany .92 8 0 9.7 57.0
Estonia 2.00 9 0 5.5 54.8
Latvia 2.75 13 0 5.4 49.3
Albania 3.50 38 1 11.8 42.0
Czech Republic 6.00 15 0 5.3 40.7
Kazakhstan 2.83 18 0 19.5 31.41128 journal of political economy
TABLE 3
(Continued)
Country Time Cost (%) GC Interest Efﬁciency
Average 2.63 17 .40 8.44 53.85
Reorganization
Taiwan, China .83 4 1 3.4 93.8
Serbia and Montenegro 2.67 23 0 21.0 28.3
Macedonia, former Yugoslav
republic 3.67 28 0 12.4 27.3
Ukraine 2.92 42 0 17.4 17.5
Average 2.52 24 .25 13.56 41.74
German legal origin average 2.37 16 .29 11.3 50.0
D. Nordic Legal Origin
Foreclosure
None
Liquidation
Sweden 1.00 9 1 5.8 86.0
Denmark 2.50 9 1 7.1 76.7
Average 1.75 9 1.00 6.46 81.33
Reorganization
Finland .92 4 1 4.8 92.4
Norway .92 1 1 8.5 91.8
Average .92 2 1.00 6.68 92.13
Nordic legal origin average 1.33 6 1.00 6.6 86.7
Note.—The table presents country data organized by both the country’s legal origin and the debt enforcement
procedure that applies in the case. For each country the table shows the time and cost of debt enforcement proceedings,
an indicator of whether Mirage will continue as a going concern, the lending rate,andtheefﬁciencyofdebtenforcement.
Table 1 describes the variables in detail.
When we average across procedures, common law countries achieve
sharply higher efﬁciency scores than either German or French legal
origin countries in their debt enforcement. Part of this comes from
their having lower interest rates than the German, and particularly the
French, legal origin countries. The German legal origin countries are
more efﬁcient than the French ones in foreclosure and liquidation but
are slightly behind in reorganization. The common law countries are
more efﬁcient than French and German legal origin ones at all pro-
cedures, although they are only slightly ahead of German legal origin
countries in liquidation. The latter have a comparative advantage at
liquidation; the common law countries have a comparative advantage
at foreclosure.
The immediate reason for the low efﬁciency of French legal origin
countries in debt enforcement is clear from the data: whatever proce-
dure they use, they succeed in keeping Mirage as a going concern in
only 16 percent of the cases. The comparable number for common law
countries is 75 percent. The failure to keep Mirage going is not just adebt enforcement around the world 1129
poor country outcome; both France and Italy fail to do so, according
to our respondents. Related to this failed effort to rehabilitate, it takes
French legal origin countries 3.40 years to resolve debt enforcement,
compared to 1.56 years for common law countries. There is no differ-
ence in the transaction costs of the procedures. These results present
a clear ﬁnding but also a puzzle: why do French legal origin countries
take so long but still fail to keep Mirage going? We try to shed light on
this question in Section VI.
The results of tables 2 and 3 are summarized compactly in table 4,
which presents cross-country ordinary least squares regressions. In col-
umns 1–3, the dependent variable is the efﬁciency of debt enforcement
procedure; in columns 4–6, the dependent variable is GC; and in col-
umns 7–9, it is Bizbank’s recovery rate (see Sec. V). The independent
variables include, depending on the speciﬁcation, the logarithm of per
capita GDP, legal origin, procedure types (with common law and fore-
closure omitted), and interaction terms of procedure type and per capita
income.
The results conﬁrm that richer countries have sharply higher efﬁ-
ciency scores and are more likely to keep Mirage as a going concern.
Compared to common law countries, French and German legal origin
countries are sharply less efﬁcient; Nordic countries are less efﬁcient
when income is held constant, but this result is not statistically signiﬁ-
cant. There are no statistically signiﬁcant differences among procedures
in either efﬁciency or keeping Mirage as a going concern, except in
the third regression the coefﬁcient on reorganization is sharply negative
and statistically signiﬁcant. Looking at the interaction terms, we do ﬁnd
support for the idea that reorganization is relatively more efﬁcient in
richer countries, but there are no statistically signiﬁcant differences
between foreclosure and liquidation. These results are supportive of the
ﬁndings in tables 2 and 3, except the conclusions about the comparative
advantage of alternative procedures are moderated.
We have reestimated the regressions in table 4 using an 8 percent
discount rate for all countries to calculate efﬁciency, as well as by using
a probit when the dependent variable is GC. The results for per capita
income and legal origins are robust to these changes.
Before moving on, we revisit two assumptions made in the calculation
of efﬁciency. First, we assumed that the costs of going through insolvency
are paid at the end and hence are discounted back from the time
insolvency is resolved in the computation of efﬁciency. We can alter-
natively assume that these costs are incurred up-front and are therefore
not discounted at all. This simple correction obviously reduces the ef-
ﬁciency measure. The worldwide average efﬁciency drops to 47.85
(about 4 points), although efﬁciency for the lower-middle-income coun-
tries falls all the way to 28.5. A few countries, such as Venezuela andT
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Angola, now have negative efﬁciency scores due to the implausibly ex-
treme front-loading of the transaction costs. The basic orderings doc-
umented in tables 2 and 3, as well as the result that richer countries
have a comparative advantage in more complex procedures, are pre-
served.
The second assumption we made is that Mirage just covers its variable
costs while in bankruptcy and generates no economic value. We can be
more optimistic about proﬁtability in bankruptcy even if we maintain,
as we have advised the respondents, that the ﬁrm does not generate
enough cash to pay back its debt. For example, we can assume that
while the proceedings are going on, Mirage generates proﬁts at the
same rate as it does once the proceedings are completed, that is, at the
rate that justiﬁes its ultimate valuation. That assumption means that in
the countries in which Mirage remains a going concern, it generates
sufﬁcient proﬁts to justify the valuation of 100 even when in bankruptcy,
which implies that the delay associated with bankruptcy has zero cost.
We think that this is implausibly optimistic.
7 Alternatively, we can assume
that while Mirage is in the insolvency proceedings, it generates enough
cash to yield the valuation of 70 (even if it is eventually preserved as a
going concern). This is better than generating no proﬁts but not as
good as if bankruptcy were not costly at all.
The assumption that Mirage generates its piecemeal sale value in
bankruptcy yields the following deﬁnition of efﬁciency:
30 # GC 100 # c
E p 70  . (2) t (1  r)
Under this deﬁnition, the worldwide average efﬁciency measure rises
to 69.6 and to 63.1 for the lower-middle-income countries. Efﬁciency
now basically reﬂects the cost of liquidating Mirage piecemeal rather
than keeping it as a going concern. Lower-middle-income countries
almost never manage to keep Mirage as a going concern, so the only
cost of insolvency is the (discounted) transaction cost. We feel that this
view is too optimistic, so we prefer our initial measure of efﬁciency.
Nonetheless, the orderings of efﬁciency measures reported in tables 2
and 3 are preserved under this speciﬁcation, except that the result that
rich countries have a comparative advantage at the more complex pro-
cedures is no longer statistically signiﬁcant.
7 Gamboa-Cavazos and Schneider (2006), in their detailed study of Mexican bankrupt-
cies, ﬁnd that a tremendous amount of value is lost during the proceedings, leading to
extremely low recovery rates for creditors.1132 journal of political economy
V. Absolute Priority
An important aspect of debt enforcement is violation of absolute priority.
In the United States, such violations result from bankruptcy judges dis-
regarding debt contracts (Franks and Torous 1989; Weiss and Wruck
1998). In other countries, the law sometimes gives other claimants pri-
ority over the secured creditors. For example, tax authorities, employees,
suppliers, or even shareholders may by law have priority over Bizbank
in their claims against Mirage. Such violations of absolute priority may
distort Bizbank’s incentive to dispose of Mirage most efﬁciently and
have adverse consequences for the development of debt markets. La
Porta et al. (1997, 1998) use violation of absolute priority by law as an
element of their creditor rights index. Our respondents provided in-
formation on deviations from absolute priority in their countries’ laws,
and here we examine these patterns. We use these data to examine an
alternative measure of quality of debt enforcement: the payoff to Biz-
bank rather than overall efﬁciency.
The raw facts on deviations from absolute priority are striking. In the
world as a whole, 55 percent of countries deviate from absolute priority
and only 45 percent respect it. Deviations from absolute priority occur
in 33 percent of high-income countries, 50 percent of upper-middle-
income countries, and 74 percent of lower-middle-income countries.
They occur in no Nordic countries, 25 percent of English legal origin
countries, 52 percent of German legal origin countries, and 74 percent
of French legal origin countries. In this particular obstacle to debt en-
forcement, the poor and the French legal origin countries again lead
the way.
For a more detailed analysis, we record the order of priority, P,i n
which claims are paid. If Bizbank, the secured creditor, is paid ﬁrst out
of the proceeds from the insolvency proceeding, then . If one P p 1
claimant group—the tax authority, workers, suppliers, or shareholders—
has priority over the secured creditor, ranking Bizbank second in pri-
ority, then . If the secured creditor is ranked third after two other P p 2
claimant groups, ; if it is ranked fourth, . One additional P p 3 P p 4
change is that, to compute Bizbank’s recovery, the relevant time is no
longer the time to resolve what happens with Mirage, but rather the
time it takes Bizbank to get paid, which we deﬁned as time to payment.
The recovery rate for the secured creditor is then given by
100 # GC 70 # (1  GC)  12 # (P  1)  100 # c
R p . (3) t (1  r)
The worldwide mean of the priority variable is 1.9. Time to payment
is on average about 3 months longer than time to resolution, although
the difference exceeds 2 years for Israel and the Czech Republic. Thedebt enforcement around the world 1133
worldwide mean of Bizbank’s recovery is 45 percent, compared to the
mean 52 percent for the efﬁciency measure. In other words, an addi-
tional 7 percent of the estate is lost to the senior creditor, on average,
because of violations of absolute priority. The correlation between pri-
ority and recovery is .52.
8 Furthermore, the correlation between the
efﬁciency of debt enforcement and Bizbank’s recovery rate is .96. Not
surprisingly, the empirical correlates of the recovery rate are essentially
the same as those of efﬁciency. Most important, per capita income and
legal origin crucially shape both. The average recovery rate is 67 percent
for common law countries, 33 percent for French legal origin countries,
43 percent for German legal origin countries, and 85 percent for Nordic
countries. The last three regressions in table 4 conﬁrm these patterns.
9
These results suggest that national priority rules undermine debt en-
forcement even relative to the dire situation that would exist if priority
were respected, especially in the lower-middle-income and French legal
origin countries.
VI. Structural Characteristics of Debt Enforcement
The results of Section IV suggest that the efﬁciency of debt enforcement
is shaped by per capita income and legal origin—two variables that
cannot be quickly changed. In this section, we look instead at a number
of structural characteristics of debt enforcement procedures and ask
whether they explain efﬁciency and its determinants. We also ask
whether such explanatory power remains even when per capita income
and legal origin are held constant. This may be too tough a test since,
as we show below, many structural characteristics of debt enforcement
are correlated with per capita income and especially legal origin. None-
theless, some tentative suggestions for improving debt enforcement pro-
cedure may emerge as a result.
Panel B of table 1 presents the 24 structural characteristics of debt
enforcement obtained from our respondents. We divide these charac-
teristics into ﬁve groups: those that pertain to all procedures (there is
only one of those), those that pertain to foreclosure only, those that
pertain to all bankruptcy procedures (i.e., liquidation and reorganiza-
tion), those that pertain to liquidation only, and those that pertain to
8 Davydenko and Frank (2008) estimate median bank recovery rates for samplesofactual
bankruptcies in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. Their estimates are 92 per-
cent, 67 percent, and 56 percent, respectively, which is not too far from our estimates of
91 percent, 56 percent, and 47 percent for the respective countries.
9 The structural variables discussed in Sec. VI that are correlated with efﬁciency are also
highly correlated with recovery.1134 journal of political economy
reorganization only. These measures include both economic and legal
characteristics of debt enforcement.
10
Table 5 presents the frequencies of these characteristics by legal or-
igin, and table 6 shows their correlations with the logarithm of per capita
income, the civil law dummy, and outcomes. We discuss the results by
procedure of relevance. Table 7 shows regressions of efﬁciency on legal
origins, per capita income, and each of the structural variables taken
one at a time, organized again by procedure of relevance. We focus on
the results in tables 5 and 6 but also indicate whether they are robust
to table 7 speciﬁcations.
The only variable that applies to all procedures is the presence of
statutory time limits on appeals. These limits tend to be present in
poorer countries and are negatively correlated with both keeping Mirage
as a going concern and efﬁciency. This negative correlation disappears
once income is controlled for in table 7.
The next three variables pertain to foreclosure. The ﬁrst two—
whether Bizbank is allowed the out-of-court seizure and sale of collateral
and whether Bizbank is allowed to enforce its claim in an out-of-court
procedure—are measures of raw creditor power in foreclosure. Both
variables are characteristic of common law foreclosure (table 5) and are
strongly associated with a shorter time to complete foreclosure, greater
likelihood of keeping Mirage as a going concern, and higher overall
efﬁciency (table 6). The third variable, ﬂoating charge, measures
whether Bizbank can by law take the whole of Mirage, as opposed to
speciﬁc ﬁxed assets, as collateral. This variable too is a characteristic of
common law legal regimes (table 5)and is associated with shorter time,
lower cost, a higher likelihood that Mirage is kept going, and higher
overall efﬁciency (table 6). The common law way of doing foreclosure,
which allows ﬂoating charge debt contracts and gives the senior creditor
enormous rights without much protection of Mirage from courts, works
very well for our case facts.
These results may shed light on a puzzling feature of the data. Recall
that, under our case assumptions, Bizbank has the socially optimal in-
centives to deal with Mirage if it can control it after the default. Why
is it, then, that in table 2, for both the rich and upper-middle-income
countries, liquidation and reorganization yield higher efﬁciency than
foreclosure? Tables 5 and 6 suggest a possible explanation: legal restric-
tions on ﬂoating charge debt, which undermine Bizbank’s ability to take
control of Mirage. This hypothesis has received some attention in recent
legal literature (e.g., Armour 2007).
To test this hypothesis, we present in table 8 separately the average
10 Our data for the structural characteristics are almost but not entirely complete, in
that we did not obtain usable information for some of the countries from our respondents.debt enforcement around the world 1135
efﬁciency of foreclosure for countries with and without ﬂoating charge.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with this hypothesis. In every income cat-
egory, the average efﬁciency of foreclosure with ﬂoating charge is higher
than that of both liquidation and reorganization. Under our case facts,
ﬂoating charge foreclosure indeed comes closest to efﬁciency, although
one must be careful to note that these results might reﬂect some other
beneﬁt of common law. These results are also broadly consistent with
Franks and Sussman’s (2005) optimistic empirical assessment of fore-
closure with ﬂoating charge in the United Kingdom.
The next round of variables deals with characteristics of bankruptcy
procedures. The ﬁrst variable—whether bankruptcy is handled by a
specialized court—shows that such courts are sharply more prevalent
in the richer and in the common law countries. The handling of bank-
ruptcy by a specialized court is associated with lower case time, lower
cost, a higher likelihood that Mirage continues as a going concern, and
a sharply higher measure of overall efﬁciency. This result, however, does
not survive in table 7.
The next six variables deal with speciﬁc aspects of the appeal process
of bankruptcy proceedings. Three of them measure whether the case
proceeds while particular appeals are made; these variables directly cap-
ture the scope for delay. Three parallel variables measure whether ap-
peals are heard by the same judge as the one issuing the initial order
or by a different judge. These variables also measure the scope for delay,
although less directly. Appeal variables are not strongly related to per
capita income or legal origin (with the exception of one “same judge”
variable). We see, however, that having the bankruptcy case proceed
(rather than be suspended) while particular rulings are appealed is
strongly related to shorter time and higher overall efﬁciency. In contrast,
having appeals heard by the same judge does not seem to inﬂuence
time or efﬁciency. Interestingly, in the regression speciﬁcations of table
6, both types of appeals variables matter for efﬁciency.
11
The next variable captures the legal requirement that reorganization
be attempted before Mirage goes into liquidation. This requirement is
more prevalent in poorer and in civil law countries and is associated
with a lower probability that Mirage continues as a going concern and
lower efﬁciency (but not in the regression). The next variable, automatic
stay, measures whether Bizbank is prevented from enforcing its security
when bankruptcy proceedings commence. It is not correlated with our
outcome measures. Automatic stay on lawsuits measures whether lawsuits
11 This ﬁnding is broadly consistent with Gamboa-Cavazos and Schneider’s (2006) study
of bankruptcy reform in Mexico, which ﬁnds that much of its beneﬁts in terms of faster
resolution of bankruptcy and higher recovery rates for creditors derived from the cur-
tailment of appeals.1136
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TABLE 8
Main Variable Averages by Procedure and Income Group,
with and without Floating Charge
Variable
Foreclosure
Liquidation Reorganization
Average
by
Income
Group
Floating
Charge
No Floating
Charge
A. High Income
Time .59 3.54 1.45 1.45 1.51
Cost (%) 5.5 15.7 11.0 6.9 8.5
Going concern 1.00 .00 .71 .80 .73
Efﬁciency 91.02 43.32 73.21 81.52 77.35
Observations 5 3 7 15 30
B. Upper-Middle Income
Time 2.31 2.98 2.83 2.69 2.80
Cost (%) 9.0 15.2 17.3 14.8 15.7
Going concern .00 .00 .30 .33 .20
Efﬁciency 50.12 37.31 50.20 44.46 46.11
Observations 2 5 10 3 20
C. Lower-Middle Income
Time 1.92 2.82 3.52 3.97 3.45
Cost (%) 10.1 15.2 19.2 17.7 16.4
Going concern .33 .00 .22 .11 .16
Efﬁciency 51.46 39.30 32.20 31.70 35.03
Observations 6 3 9 19 38
D. Total
Time 1.47 3.09 2.70 2.84 2.64
Cost (%) 8.2 15.3 16.3 13.1 13.5
Going concern .54 .00 .38 .41 .36
Efﬁciency 66.47 39.49 50.16 52.93 51.97
Observations 13 11 26 37 88
Note.—The table presents the mean values of time, cost, expectation of keeping Mirage as a going concern, and
efﬁciency of debt enforcement organized by both country income group and the debt enforcement procedure that
applies in the case. Table 1 describes the variables in detail.
against Mirage are automatically stayed when bankruptcy proceedings
commence. It is also uncorrelated with outcomes.
The next ﬁve variables cover the rules governing Mirage operations
in bankruptcy proceedings. In some countries, Mirage ceases operations
upon commencement of bankruptcy. Not surprisingly, this rule makes
it less likely that Mirage survives as a going concern and is associated
with lower efﬁciency (in the regression as well). In some countries,
suppliers and customers may rescind contracts with Mirage without pen-
alty upon the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings. This rule, more
prevalent in the poorer countries, prolongs the case, prevents Mirage
from continuing as a going concern, and is associated with sharply lower
efﬁciency (in the regression as well). Some countries restrict dismissals
by Mirage. Such restrictions reduce the likelihood that Mirage survives1144 journal of political economy
as a going concern and have an adverse, though not statistically signif-
icant, effect on efﬁciency. Finally, it does not appear to matter whether
the management team of Mirage remains in control of ordinary business
during bankruptcy proceedings. Again, this battery of variables yields a
clear bottom line about what does not work in bankruptcy: measures
that disrupt Mirage’s operations during bankruptcy (which may have
some logic to them, such as reduction of tunneling) for our case facts
make it less likely that Mirage survives and therefore reduce efﬁciency.
The ﬁnal group of all bankruptcy variables describes the control of
the bankruptcy process and in particular the role of the creditors. The
results in tables 5–7 do not provide consistent evidence that it matters
whether Bizbank has the right to appoint or to dismiss the bankruptcy
administrator or whether that administrator is paid on the basis of the
market value of the estate.
We have one structural variable that pertains to liquidation only,
namely, the presence of an “automatic trigger,” such as a certain period
of nonpayment, for liquidation. It is not correlated with efﬁciency.
Finally, we have two structural variables that deal with reorganization
only. It appears beneﬁcial for the cost, the likelihood of survival of
Mirage, and overall efﬁciency that creditors vote directly rather than in
a committee on the reorganization plan. This means that giving less
voting power to unsecured creditors is better for efﬁciency, in line with
the theoretical prediction for Mirage. And it does not seem to matter
whether the law requires a proof of reorganization prospects before
reorganization is attempted.
We have already mentioned the regression results in table 7, where
we control for both per capita income and legal origin, so here is just
a brief summary. In virtually all regressions, French legal origin contin-
ues to exert an adverse inﬂuence on efﬁciency and per capita income
a positive inﬂuence. Our structural characteristics do not kill these enor-
mously powerful effects. For foreclosure, out-of-court seizure and sale
of assets, as well as ﬂoating charge debt contracts, are conducive to
higher efﬁciency. For bankruptcy, it is beneﬁcial from the standpoint
of efﬁciency for the bankruptcy proceedings to continue during appeal
and for the same judge who made an initial ruling to hear the appeal
as well. We also see that cessation of operations upon entering bank-
ruptcy and allowing suppliers and customers to rescind contracts are
both associated with lower efﬁciency. Finally, the results conﬁrm that it
is beneﬁcial for creditors to vote directly rather than in a committee,
which means that more power to Bizbank is good.
In summary, there are four robust bottom lines for our case facts.
First, foreclosure works best with maximum creditor rights, minimum
court involvement, and ﬂoating charge debt contracts. Second, a robust
strategy for reducing the time and improving the efﬁciency of bank-debt enforcement around the world 1145
TABLE 9
Private Credit/GDP Regressions
Dependent Variable: Private Credit/GDP (Average 1999–2003)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP .093* .083* .088* .104* .097* .100*
(.018) (.021) (.019) (.019) (.021) (.020)
GDP per capita growth .011 .009 .009 .018 .017 .015
(.013) (.010) (.010) (.015) (.012) (.012)
Inﬂation .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .002**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Contract enforcement days .081*** .070*** .078** .118* .106** .111*
(.043) (.043) (.036) (.045) (.044) (.036)
Creditor rights index .100* .108*
(.030) (.029)
Information sharing .200* .193*
(.066) (.067)
Efﬁciency .006* .006* .005*
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Efﬁciency with constant 8% .004*** .003 .003***
(.002) (.003) (.002)
French legal origin .109 .166
(.107) (.105)
German legal origin .216** .231**
(.099) (.100)
Nordic legal origin .190 .158
(.152) (.140)
Constant 1.577* 1.276** 1.790* 1.580* 1.271** 1.835*
(.515) (.560) (.477) (.544) (.575) (.489)
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84
2 R .556 .584 .646 .519 .550 .617
Note.—The table presents cross-section ordinary least squares regressions using a sample of 84 countries. The
dependent variable is private credit as a share of GDP, averaged over 1999–2003. Independent variables are the country’s
GDP, GDP per capita growth, a measure of the efﬁciency of contract enforcement, the strength of creditor rights, the
presence of credit information systems, the efﬁciency of the debt enforcement procedure, the efﬁciency of the debt
enforcement procedure assuming a constant 8 percent discount rate across all countries, and the origin of the country’s
bankruptcy laws. Table 1 describes the variables in detail. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
ruptcy proceedings is to circumscribe the appeals process. Third, bank-
ruptcy rules that have the effect of stopping or curtailing the operations
of Mirage during bankruptcy are not conducive to efﬁciency. Fourth,
voting procedures that reduce the power of unsecured creditors work
well in our case.
VII. Debt Market Development
Do our measures of efﬁciency of debt enforcement predict the devel-
opment of debt markets? Following the work of La Porta et al. (1997,
1998) and Levine (1999), we present some basic regressions addressing
this issue. These regressions cannot be given a causal interpretation but
do provide some cross-validation of our efﬁciency measure.
Table 9 presents the now relatively standard speciﬁcation (La Porta
et al. 1997; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007) of the determinants1146 journal of political economy
of the ratio of private credit to GDP for the 84 countries with available
data. We control for total GDP, GDP per capita growth, inﬂation, and
contract enforcement days (a measure of the quality of the legal system).
In some speciﬁcations, we include the creditor rights index and a mea-
sure of whether a county has a public or a private credit registry (in-
formation sharing). In other speciﬁcations, we control for legal origin.
The results conﬁrm the earlier ﬁndings that the level of GDP and
contract enforcement days are correlated with the ratio of private credit
to GDP. Also as in earlier work, both the creditor rights index and
information sharing predict the size of the private debt market (Has-
elman, Pistor, and Vig 2005; Djankov et al. 2007). Neither GDP per
capita growth nor inﬂation is signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation. There is
no statistically signiﬁcant residual adverse effect of French legal origin
on private credit, although there remains one of German legal origin
as compared to common law. Efﬁciency has a highly statistically signif-
icant positive effect on the private debt to GDP ratio. A 10-point increase
in efﬁciency is associated with a 5–6-point higher ratio of debt to GDP
(the mean is 57 percent and the standard deviation is 43 percent). These
effects of efﬁciency fall by a third but remain signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
level in two out of three speciﬁcations when we compute efﬁciency using
a ﬁxed 8 percent discount rate for all countries. The reason for a weaker
ﬁnding with ﬁxed rates is that one source of inefﬁciency of debt en-
forcement is high interest rates, which are higher in countries with lower
debt to GDP ratios. Overall, the ﬁndings in table 9 are consistent with
the view that our efﬁciency of debt enforcement measure captures some
empirically relevant aspects of creditor power.
VIII. Conclusion
We have found that debt enforcement around the world is highly in-
efﬁcient, even in the relatively simple case we consider. The inefﬁciency
comes from high administrative costs and long delays, but also from
excessive piecemeal sales of viable businesses. The inefﬁciency is linked
to underdevelopment, which probably proxies for poor public-sector
capacity of a country, and to French legal origin, which probably proxies
for excessive formalism of the debt enforcement process. The inefﬁ-
ciency is also related to such structural aspects of debt enforcement as
ineffective collateral systems, poorly structured appeals, business inter-
ruptions during bankruptcy, and inefﬁcient voting among creditors. The
inefﬁciency correlates with underdeveloped debt markets, consistent
with the view that failures of debt enforcement discourage lending.
The narrative that emerges from these ﬁndings is straightforward.
Developing countries follow the rich ones and introduce elaborate bank-
ruptcy procedures, presumably designed to save and rehabilitate insol-debt enforcement around the world 1147
vent ﬁrms. In the rich countries, although these procedures are time-
consuming and expensive, they typically succeed in preserving the ﬁrm
as a going concern. In the developing countries, in contrast, these pro-
cedures nearly always fail in their basic economic goal of saving the
ﬁrm; in fact, 80 percent of insolvent businesses end up being sold piece-
meal. The odds of saving the ﬁrm are especially low in the French legal
origin countries, which have highly formal bankruptcy procedures.
Does our very simple case, which abstracts from some aspects of debt
contracts, suggest any strategies for improving the available procedures?
We note from the start that our ﬁndings do not apply to very large ﬁrms
with complex capital structures. But such ﬁrms are very few in devel-
oping countries, and the resolution of their insolvency is heavily polit-
icized anyhow. Presumably such ﬁrms end up in special bankruptcy
regimes, no matter how inefﬁcient. But what can we say about small
and medium ﬁrms, which are the vast majority?
Under current arrangements, middle-income countries nearly always
fail to save a viable ﬁrm, despite time and cost. This suggests that, for
small and medium ﬁrms, poor countries should avoid debt enforcement
mechanisms that involve detailed and extensive court oversight since
the administrative capacity of their courts may not tolerate such pro-
ceedings. Simpler mechanisms, such as foreclosure with no or limited
court oversight and ﬂoating charge, which essentially transfer control
of the ﬁrm to the secured creditor, might be preferred. These simple
mechanisms may work well in a broader set of circumstances than our
case facts. For example, they should work well if the efﬁcient outcome
is to sell the ﬁrm piecemeal. The risk of tunneling by management also
strengthens the case for quick foreclosure. Even when more than one
creditor is secured, foreclosure should work well as long as there is one
principal creditor with security over most assets. Such a creditor might
even provide super-priority ﬁnancing to save the ﬁrm.
More generally, in a developing country, less formalistic mechanisms
might improve debt enforcement. For example, restricting appeals
might shorten the proceedings and improve efﬁciency, as the case of
Mexico illustrates (Gamboa-Cavazos and Schneider 2006). As countries
become richer and the ﬁnancial structures of more of their ﬁrms more
complex, more elaborate proceedings, including reorganization, might
become appropriate. But the data show that extensive public-sector in-
volvement ahead of public-sector capacity fails in achieving its goals.
Debt enforcement reforms might conﬂict with other legal institutions
of a country. For example, debt enforcement appears to be a victim of
structural features of some civil law regimes, such as extensive appeals,
reversal of priority in bankruptcy, and restrictions on “ﬂoating charge.”
The latter problem is particularly noteworthy since our evidence indi-
cates that foreclosure with ﬂoating charge yields the highest levels of1148 journal of political economy
efﬁciency, consistent with theoretical predictions for our case facts.
These prevailing rules might be embedded in the legal framework of a
country, such as registration of assets or the rules on what may serve as
collateral (Armour 2007). This said, restricting appeals in bankruptcy
proceedings and moving toward absolute priority and to ﬂoating charge
debt can be feasible under civil law as well. According to our evidence,
many rather small changes in how debt enforcement is organized might
have positive social payoffs.
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